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PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT. By 
Richard F. Hixson. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. 
xvi, 255. $19.95. 
Privacy is a vague and inclusive notion, but the lack of a precise 
definition1 does not indicate that Americans are indifferent to privacy. 
Professor Hixson's2 Privacy in a Public Society asserts that today's so-
ciety is increasingly jealous of its privacy (p. xiv). Hixson finds this 
trend worrisome, because he feels that the impulse to withdraw into 
private life will undermine the commitment to public affairs that he 
identifies as crucial to the proper functioning of any society (p. 132). 
His work has two purposes: to trace and explain the role of law in 
creating, defining, and enforcing privacy; and to argue that continued 
attention be paid to achieving "the best of both worlds": a commit-
ment by each individual to the community and to the societal benefits 
of a public life, combined with protection for the individual privacy we 
all seem to desire. 
Privacy in a Public Society undertakes three separate tasks, and 
achieves differing levels of success with each. The first is to explain the 
development of privacy from its status in colonial America as "more a 
matter of honor than of law"(p. 14) to its present position as a core 
value of modem society, both legalized and constitutionalized. The 
second is to argue, along with Jeremy Bentham, Hannah Arendt, and 
others, that privacy should "wear the character of exceptions,"3 that 
is, that society (and law) should protect privacy but keep it as a secon-
dary virtue that will not undermine the necessary public life of the 
citizens. The third task is to use this argument to inform the analysis 
of and prescription for contemporary privacy problems. 
The largest portion of the work is devoted to historical exegesis. 
Drawing on many and varied sources, Hixson examines the etymology 
of "privacy," the interaction of geography and architecture with pri-
vacy, and the attitudes toward privacy revealed in the popular litera-
ture of the 1800s. He reviews the work of Warren and Brandeis in the 
late 1880s when the relentless and insensitive Boston press prompted 
these two scholars to propose legal status for a right to privacy: "The 
1. Several alternative definitions have been offered: the right of an individual to determine 
what information about herself may be communicated to others; the measure of control an indi-
vidual has over "intimacies of [her] personal identity"; or the measure of control an individual 
has over "sensory access" to her person. See Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions, 21 
AMER. PHIL. Q. 199 (1984). Professor Hixson discusses some of the many other possible mean· 
ings of "privacy," including privacy as autonomy and privacy as liberty. 
2. Richard F. Hixson is Professor of Communication Law and Journalism History in the 
School of Communication, Information, and Library Studies, Rutgers University. 
3. P. 102 (emphasis in text) (quoting THE COMPLETE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 351-80 
(J. Bowring ed. 1843)). 
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design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs 
the community has no legitimate concern .... "4 
The new cause of action gradually gained acceptance in the courts. 
By 1960 the common law had given private plaintiffs redress for reve-
lation of private facts, intrusion on privacy, false light depiction, and 
misappropriation of name or likeness. 5 Hixson examines the common 
law development and the alternative constructions of the privacy right 
offered by several scholars. 6 He then moves to the constitutionaliza-
tion of privacy, focusing on Olmstead v. United States, 7 Poe v. Ull-
man, 8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 9 and Roe v. Wade. 10 Throughout this 
historical account, the author explains each new rule and application, 
examines critical comments on the decisions, and assesses how the de-
cisions or theories deal with privacy itself. Of the constitutional deci-
sions, Hixson argues that "the Court over a span of tiine appears to 
have been consistent ... in wanting the best of both worlds ... " (p. 
· 87). The Justices have sought to protect some fundamental privacy 
rights (e.g., marital intimacy), but not to create broad blanket protec-
tions that would hinder the pursuit of information for our democratic 
society's functioning or foster individual isolation that would be detri-
mental to the community. 
Professor Hixson, here as in the remainder of the book, demon-
strates the depth and breadth of his reading. While the presentation is 
at times rather choppy, consisting of a long series of quotes and cita-
tions, this lack of polish may be understandable given the survey na-
ture of the work. 11 One significant problem, however, undermines the 
reader's confidence in Hixson's general accuracy: In places he miscon-
strues cases. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 12 a majority of the Court agreed with 
4. P. 34 (quoting Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 214 
(1890)). 
5. Pp. 52-55. These categories are from W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w OF TORTS 
(1955). The Warren and Brandeis claim is Prosser's private-facts tort. The facts made public 
must be ones that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and not of legitimate concern 
to the public. Intrusion involves invading an expectation of seclusion, usually physical privacy. 
False light involves information that is likely to mislead the public about the individuals por-
trayed. Appropriation is "the unauthorized use of one's name or likeness for commercial pur-
poses." P. 54. 
6. Pp. 52-70. Hixson draws on the work of Edward Bloustein, Alan Westin, Gary Bostwick, 
and Judee Burgoon, in addition to Prosser and a series of cases applying privacy rights. 
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
8. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
IO. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
11. Unfortunately, the entire work is marred by what seems an utter lack of editing. The 
Oxford University Press has published a volume that contains verbless sentences, nonparallel 
structures, and clauses whose actual meaning differs from their apparently intended meaning. 
Such errors do not dispose the reader to enjoy the book. 
12. 381 U.S. 479 (striking down a Connecticut anti-contraception statute). 
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Justice Douglas' penumbra approach to finding a constitutional right 
of privacy.13 Douglas adopted this peculiar and strained analysis in 
order to avoid what he viewed as the discredited doctrine of substan-
tive due process. The privacy part of the Griswold decision is Doug-
las', and his alone. The concurring opinions, whether they also join 
his (Goldberg, with Warren and Brennan) or simply agree with the 
result (Harlan and White, separately), all assert a separate basis for the 
decision. They all rely on the liberty protected by the Constitution. 
Harlan and White do not agree that a privacy right exists in the Con-
stitution, while Goldberg does accept such a right. 
Hixson attributes to Harlan the view that privacy was a fundamen-
tal right, "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a 
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless re-
straints. "14 But Harlan wrote these words about "the liberty guaran-
teed by the Due Process Clause,"15 not about privacy. His refusal to 
join Douglas' opinion in Griswold provides evidence for this distinc-
tion. It is true that, in the overall scheme of the book, Hixson's mis-
construal is hardly fatal. Griswold does establish a constitutional right 
of privacy, and nothing in Hixson's argument depends on having use 
of Harlan's analysis. But the error casts some doubt on the accuracy 
of Hixson's reporting of other sources, 16 and may impair the book's 
usefulness as an introduction to the vast array of materials on privacy 
and privacy law. 
The middle section of Privacy in a Public Society makes Hixson's 
central argument: that our society must have a developed sense of 
community in order to survive and that privacy needs community in 
order to exist. Hixson views the sense of community "as both a haven 
for the necessary private life and as a place for creative public commit-
ment" (p. 132). Relying on Bentham, Hixson argues that privacy is a 
utility right, one valuable only to the extent that it helps society and 
operative only if the state will (through law) enforce it. The law 
should protect privacy only when to do so will not stifle the commu-
nity and the public commitment of its members. 
Why do we need a sense of community, why is privacy such a 
threat to community, and why does privacy need community in order 
13. 381 U.S. 479. Douglas' majority opinion, joined by four others (Hixson incorrectly cites 
it as a seven-member opinion, p. 76, but only five Justices agreed on the penumbra! privacy 
approach to the decision), held that penumbras of certain of the Bill of Rights must be protected 
if the core values are to remain secure. Douglas found a privacy right based in the first, third, 
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. See 381 U.S. at 482-86. 
14. P. 75 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Harlan 
refers to this dissent in his Griswold concurrence as a fuller elaboration of his views in Griswold 
(the two cases involved challenges to the same statute). 381 U.S. at 500. 
15. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543. 
16. This doubt is exacerbated by Hixson's construal of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), as privacy cases (pp. 72-73) when 
they, too, are based in fourteenth amendment liberty. 
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to exist? Drawing on Hannah Arendt's work in philosophy,17 Hixson 
answers that privacy, taken to an extreme, leads to the isolation of 
individuals. And in modern society, which "functions largely on the 
interdependence of individuals" (p. 132), a real life is impossible with-
out the "presence of others."18 Certain parts of life are truly private in 
that they are "beyond government intrusion and manipulation" (p. 
129), but that sphere is small. 
"[T]o be obs~sed with privacy is to live a life deprived of objective 
relationships, devoid of any intermediary element, and destructive of 
aspirations more permanent than life itself," says Hixson (p. 130). 
"Our modern society, by encouraging competitiveness among other-
wise egalitarian individuals, the privatizing of persons, actually creates 
a high degree of competitive indifference that works against common 
progress. When such a society promotes isolation, it fosters alienation 
among its people" (pp. 130-31). Hixson is concerned that a society 
where individuals are "afraid of being manipulated and worr[ied] 
about their personal privacy" (p. 131) will give too much legal and 
moral protection to privacy, at the expense of the civic responsibility 
and public commitment necessary to maintain our interdependent 
world. "If the state is to survive, the individual must be more public 
than private" (p. 93). 
Conversely, privacy cannot survive without a developed sense of 
community. "Privacy is a right created and bestowed by others ... " 
(p. xiv). Without a community feeling, society will disintegrate and 
the forces that created the environment for privacy will disappear. 
"Privacy gets its strength from the community, from the others with 
whom the individual interacts" (p. 227). 
The final portion of Privacy in a Public Society treats some modern 
privacy problems, including governmental and private organizations' 
compilation, via sophisticated computer data banks, of sensitive infor-
mation about all of us. Hixson worries that, in legislating a solution to 
this new threat to personal privacy, we will fail to strike the necessary 
balance between privacy and publicity. But since the middle section of 
the book fails to develop any method for finding the delicate balance 
Hixson calls for, this third section falls short of its promise of develop-
ing a prescription for contemporary privacy problems. 
The rise of computerized data systems has, to a degree, changed 
the focus of concerns about privacy. "Today, when people congregate 
to complain about their loss of personal autonomy, they focus on data 
intrusion by the government and other organizations with large cen-
tralized and interlocked information systems."19 The two main laws 
17. See H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CoNDffiON 50-52 (1958): 
18. F. 129 (citing H. ARENDT, supra note 17, at 50). 
19. P. 209. Hixson offers no e!Ilpirical support whatsoever to buttress this claim, although 
the argument that these systems present a threat contains intuitive appeal. 
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that impact on this "data intrusion" are the Freedom of Information 
Act ("FOIA")20 and the Privacy Act. 21 Professor Hixson describes 
the workings of the two statutes, including an extensive section com-
menting on the developments of the nine exemptions22 under the 
FOIA, and concentrates on the potential conflict between the FOIA's 
command of openness and the Privacy Act's attempt to control what 
information is revealed to the public. 23 
Despite the presence of these statutes, which seek to balance pri-
vacy and the openness needed by our society, Professor Hixson argues 
that the statutes are not enough to fill the gap in privacy protection 
created by the fourth amendment's inability to evolve quickly enough 
to keep up with advances in data gathering processes. The fourth 
amendment24 served as an effective control over physical invasions of 
privacy for the era in which it was conceived, because such invasions 
were then possible only by "actual entry onto property, eavesdropping 
by ear, and the overseeing of individuals and groups" (p. 214). But 
with technological advances, our privacy is no longer as secure as the 
· fourth amendment formerly assured it would be. Therefore, Hixson 
calls for a redefinition of what privacy means in order to cope with the 
new problems of computer-driven data collection, and for formulation 
of new laws to protect that privacy. "American society wants more 
and better information and personal privacy" (p. 216), so we must act 
to protect our privacy in a way that will not hinder the efficiency of the 
data systems; we must preserve "the best of both worlds." 
Hixson's analysis is persuasive25 here largely because he avoids the 
easy move to claiming a right of privacy in the personal data. His 
avoidance of the rights issue shows both admirable restraint and a fo-
cus fixed on his true concerns. Rather than advocating constitutional 
reform, Hixson argues that legislative change will be sufficient because 
the problems can be treated with fairly narrow solutions and are likely 
to change as privacy notions evolve. Legislation is easier to pass and 
20. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (1982). 
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982). 
22. Pp. 192-204 (summarizing the Duke Law Journal's annual reviews of the law on the 
exemptions). The extensive reliance on others' work is indicative ofHixson's style in Privacy in a 
Public Society, underscoring the introductory nature of the book. 
23. Hixson realizes and explains that the FOIA, despite its avowed purpose of freeing the 
flow of information to the public, has become a powerful tool used by government agencies to 
restrict access to information. See pp. 187 & 205. 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
25. Hixson's analysis of the privacy purposes and effects of the fourth amendment and its 
failure to keep up with advancing information technology is one of the few insights that seems to 
be truly his own. It is both plausible and persuasive, despite the lack of any detailed argument 
supporting his assertion that these computerized data systems pose so severe a threat to privacy, 
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to modify than are constitutional amendments, and finding a right to 
informational privacy in our current Constitution poses even more 
problems than gathering support for new privacy statutes. 
Despite the usefulness of the fourth amendment analysis, this sec-
tion, and therefore the book, is disappointing. Having announced a 
problem and called for a redefinition of informational privacy and new 
legal measures to solve the conflict, Hixson provides no solutions of 
his own, even of a tentative sort. He concludes, "Once agreement 
[over redefinition] is reached, a fair and equitable procedure could be 
established for deciding when a person has 'waived' her or his right by 
making the information public" (pp. 228-29). Perhaps, given his call 
for discussion and agreement, Hixson feels it unnecessary to offer a 
solution of his own. But it seems odd to progress through a laborious 
history of privacy, a complex argument for community, and an analy-
sis of current legal privacy problems and then shy away from attempt-
ing a solution of the chief conflict identified. While Hixson's historical 
section is capable, it does not carry the work: by venturing beyond 
history into social theory and its implications for current legal 
problems, Hixson aims higher. In failing to offer any solutions that his 
theory might suggest, Hixson seems to fall short of the promise that 
his work holds. 
The discussion of the Privacy Act,26 especially of the early propo-
sal that would have applied to private organizations as well as to the 
government, hints at the kind of solution that Hixson seeks. The cur-
rent Privacy Act prohibits "the government's disclosure of individual 
records without the individual's prior written consent" (p. 224). The 
law is, however, riddled with exceptions,27 and it does not apply to the 
large private organizations that hold sensitive personal data in their 
computer banks. Professor Hixson finds the present Privacy Act in-
sufficient to deal with the growing problem he identifies. A revised 
Act, however, might be the solution toward .which he gropes at the 
end of the book. 
This is where the inadequacy of the theory of privacy, developed in 
the middle section of the book, reveals itself. Hixson has formulated 
no method for deciding how to strike the balance between privacy and 
publicity. A revision of the Privacy Act may well be the answer he 
seeks, but Hixson gives us little guidance as to what this solution 
might look like. Which exceptions to the broad no-disclosure-with-
out-written-consent rule would best be excised? This is where balanc-
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982). Hixson discusses the Act at pp. 184-85 and 223-27. 
27. The exceptions deal with disclosure for officers and employees of the agency that main-
tains the records involved; FOIA requests; routine use compatible with the purpose for which the 
data were originally collected; Census Bureau data; data used for statistical research; and data for 
the National Archives, for law enforcement, for health and safety, for either House of Congress, 
for the Comptroller General, and for data releases pursuant to a court order. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a (1982). 
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ing becomes crucial, where it becomes difficult to retain "the best of 
both worlds." Hixson profitably could have added to the assemblage 
of comments on the data privacy concem28 his own balance of the 
privacy and efficiency interests in a revised Act. If, as it seems, he is 
worried about the current balance being weighed too far toward open-
ness, he could start by cutting the Privacy Act exceptions that most 
bother him and appear least likely to hinder informational efficiency in 
our economy. Even providing a starting point for further work would 
have greatly increased the usefulness of Privacy in a Public Society. 
- David Clark Esseks 
28. Professor Hixson draws on several authors who have identified this data privacy concern 
in the past. Primary among these sources are D. BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER 
STATE (1984), and A. MILLER, THE Ass~ULT ON PRIVACY (1971). 
